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 I develop the case for reparations to African Americans today, based on wrongdoing that 
began with slavery.  Critics of such claims remind us that slavery was abolished a century and a 
half ago, no one who was either a slave or a slave holder is alive today; and moral culpability 
cannot be inherited, from which they infer that the time for reparations is long past.  Defenders 
of reparations reply that racial subordination did not end with the abolition of slavery but was 
maintained under Jim Crow; that the wrongs of those systems have caused deeply entrenched, 
lasting harms; and that state and federal governments, as well as some of today’s corporations, 
universities, and individuals are morally accountable because they helped establish or support 
slavery or Jim Crow or have profited from them. 
 References to the harms that were caused by slavery and that were sustained or caused by 
Jim Crow may suggest that reparations could consist of cash payments to compensate for any 
persisting harms.  Cash payments would seem an important component of reparations, but I will 
suggest that they would not suffice.  On the one hand, moral wrongs are not reducible to material 
harms and cannot be fully repaired by material compensation.  On the other hand, slavery and 
Jim Crow were not just a collection of wrongs, such as unpaid labor and poor housing.  They 
were all-encompassing systems that prevented African Americans from developing their 
interests, their intellects, and indeed their lives as they were morally entitled to do. This  
subordination of African Americans was justified by  a profoundly insulting ideology of white 




supremacy that has greatly affected American culture and has contaminated the attitudes of 
whites and blacks.  A morally adequate program of reparations would enable the survivors of 
those systems to rebuild their lives, free of oppressive racism, as far as that is possible. 
 The argument proceeds as follows:  Part I reviews the historical background.  Part II 
discusses the moral considerations that underlie reparations claims. Part III suggests what 
reparations were due when slavery was abolished.  Part IV extends that reasoning by suggesting 
what reparations were called for when Jim Crow was officially abolished, and what is called for 
today.  Part V notes some wider implications of the moral considerations that are assumed by the 
reparations argument. 
 
I. The History 
 English colonists on mainland North America adopted slavery by the 1630s (Lyons, 
2013, Takaki, 2008).  Virginia and its neighboring colonies focused on the profitable business of 
raising tobacco and other cash crops for export.  Indentured servants initially provided the labor, 
but the colonial elite soon decided to rely primarily on slaves, most of whom came, directly or 
indirectly, from Africa. 
 In the late 18th century or shortly thereafter many of the newly-independent states 
abolished slavery.  At the same time, they ratified a Constitution that supported slavery 
(agreeing, for example, to return escaped slaves).  Slave labor became the foundation of 
Southern economic growth and prosperity, which in the antebellum period exceeded that of the 
North.  Slave-grown cotton became America’s leading export, its total value greater than all 




 By 1865, when slavery was abolished, America was the inhospitable home to four 
million slaves.  Following emancipation, legal reforms enabled African Americans to vote, hold 
public office, and serve on juries, despite violent resistance by supporters of racial subordination.  
Federal troops routed terrorist organizations that sought to overthrow Reconstruction.  But the 
government soon abandoned those efforts.  In 1877, federal troops ceased enforcing 
Reconstruction laws.  Federal courts subsequently weakened the new constitutional amendments 
and laws that sought to secure African Americans’ legal rights (Foner, 1989). 
 As the former slaves received no reparations for their enslavement (not even the “40 
acres and a mule” that some were loaned during the Civil War; Foner, 1989, pp. 70-71), they 
lacked the wherewithal to realize the promises of emancipation.  Most became sharecroppers for 
plantation owners whose fraudulent accounting kept them perpetually in debt.  With force, fraud, 
and strength of numbers, white supremacists regained control of Southern governments, which 
then revised their laws in order to exclude African Americans from the ballot box, public office, 
and jury service.  Federal courts accepted the enactments so long as they were superficially race-
neutral.  The Supreme Court approved state-sponsored racial segregation, on the condition that 
separate facilities be equal, which was openly flouted. 
Throughout the nation, inequality and oppression were imposed.  African Americans 
could be killed or assaulted with impunity, as there was no owner to compensate for the loss and 
no chance of officials intervening.  The ever-present threat of lynching was a crucial means of 
racial re-subordination, especially in the 1890s when thousands were lynched (Zangrando, 1980).  
Pogroms destroyed black communities that appeared to prosper (Browne-Marshall, 2013, pp. 66-
72).  The result was an exceedingly cruel and degrading system that subjected African 




profoundly insulting white supremacist ideology.  Many Southern blacks who were able to 
escape the South migrated North or West, greatly enlarging black communities in cities across 
the U.S. (Wilkerson, 2010)  There they confronted systematic discrimination in housing, 
education, and employment, which led to the creation of black urban “ghettos” and deeply 
entrenched racial stratification. 
 The development of industrial unions and New Deal programs during the 1930s brought 
some benefits to black workers and their families.  During World War II many Americans saw 
that Jim Crow resembled the racism of America’s wartime foes, such as Nazi Germany, and civil 
rights campaigns received wider support.  Those efforts were intensified as black veterans of the 
segregated armed forces returned home unwilling to accept second class citizenship (Dittmer, 
1994, chap.1).  President Truman created a Committee on Civil Rights, which catalogued Jim 
Crow’s inequities:  African Americans had substantially less access to medical care than 
European Americans, much higher infant mortality, and lower life expectancy; inferior housing 
and schools; restricted access to jobs, skilled trades, and professions; much lower wages for 
comparable work, much higher unemployment rates, much longer periods of unemployment, and 
much lower family income.  They were subjected to police brutality and to widespread bias in 
the legal system (President’s Committee, 1947). 
  During the post-war period, America competed with the Soviet Union around the world.  
Each sought military alliances with the newly independent, post-colonial nations of Asia and 
Africa as well as their resources and markets.  America’s reputation among peoples of color and 
its global aspirations were threatened when images were broadcast abroad of peacefully 
demonstrating African Americans who sought to exercise their legal rights were met with official 




Supreme Court ruled against state-sponsored racial segregation and Congress enacted significant 
civil rights legislation, which federal courts upheld and the executive branch enforced.  African 
Americans were elected and appointed to public office in greater numbers and opportunities 
increased in education and the workplace (Franklin & Moss, 1994, p. 528). 
 But federal interest in reform was once again limited, in both scope and duration.  As to 
scope: the reforms failed to address entrenched inequalities, such as the consequences of Jim 
Crow housing policies.  For decades, government agencies, banks, and insurers had intensified 
the impact of segregation by making private homes more expensive and often unaffordable for 
African Americans.  Black families’ resulting lack of financial resources blocked upward 
mobility and left them without funds when they faced illness, unemployment, and other 
emergencies.  De facto segregation was further intensified as government at all levels supported 
programs of “urban renewal,” which reduced the stock of affordable housing, and constructed 
highways that facilitated “white flight” from urban centers to racially restrictive suburbs.  
Housing reforms were promised, but when the Fair Housing Act was enacted in 1968, it lacked 
enforcement provisions; and when they were added, in 1988, they were not funded.  After federal 
courts ruled against racial segregation in public housing, funding for housing projects 
disappeared (Massey and Denton, 1993; Oliver and Shapiro, 2006). 
 By the 1980s, despite continuing widespread poverty, Congress began reducing anti-
poverty programs.  Affordable housing programs were neglected.  Government policies 
intensified unequal rates of arrest, conviction, and incarceration, which disrupt Black families, 
reduce their housing options, and extinguish employment opportunities.  The effects have led 
some scholars to speak of a “new Jim Crow” (Alexander, 2010).  As if to confirm this 




aimed at excluding people with limited resources from the polls, including many African 
Americans.  And, despite those developments, the Supreme Court has weakened the Voting 
Rights Act (Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S.___ (2013)). 
 
II. Moral Considerations 
 The history recounted in Part I supports a moral argument for reparations (understood as 
compensation for wrongful injury, as distinct from compensation more generally, which repairs 
loss that is suffered for any reason, and from restitution, which relinquishes gains that were 
derived from  wrongdoing, not necessarily that of the beneficiary). As both slavery and Jim 
Crow involved such practices as morally unwarranted imprisonment, coercion, and homicide, 
rape, torture, and mutilation, they clearly violated the moral requirement that we treat others with 
consideration and respect, including those with whom we have no established relationships and 
to whom we have made no binding commitments.  The moral wrongs of slavery and Jim Crow 
involved economic, physical, and psychological harms, many of which have had profound, 
lasting effects on African Americans today, such as the wealth gap between black and white 
families, which stems from income differences combined with discriminatory housing policies. 
 Morality calls for the repair of such wrongs, within moral as well as practical limits.  
Individuals may be morally required to repair, or to help repair, the wrongs, for at least three 
different reasons:  first, because they helped initiate or supported slavery or Jim Crow; second, 
because they failed to combat such practices when it was incumbent on them to do so; and third, 
because they profited from them.  Regarding those in the first category, although no one who 
supported chattel slavery in America is alive today, some individuals are alive who supported 




present purposes, institutions, such as governments, universities, and for-profit corporations, 
which can last for generations, acquire moral responsibility for their acts and policies and their 
predictable consequences.  Thus, President Clinton properly apologized on behalf of the U.S. 
government in 1997 for the Tuskegee syphilis study of 1932-1972 (which misinformed poor 
Blacks of their illness and denied them effective treatment when it became available;  
Washington, 2006, chap. 7), and Congress did right in 1993 by apologizing to the people of 
Hawaii for the U.S. government’s part in the overthrow of the Hawaiian government a century 
earlier (U.S. Public Law 103-150).  Second, we are morally required not only to act justly and 
avoid supporting injustice but also to help combat systematic injustice, as the moral stakes 
require and circumstances allow.  This suggests that many Americans were culpable for failing 
to help end or ameliorate slavery or Jim Crow when the stakes were sufficient to justify the risks 
involved.  It would not have been unduly dangerous for many more Americans to have supported 
the antislavery movement than actually did so, and the same could be said even more 
emphatically of the civil rights movement that challenged Jim Crow.  To this we may add, 
ignorance that is caused by the failure to pay adequate attention to systematic injustices of which 
one is vaguely aware and to which attention can be paid without much difficulty does not nullify 
one’s culpability for failing to address such egregious social wrongs.  Third, we can be morally 
required to relinquish wrongful gains – benefits that stem from wrongdoing that is not 
necessarily our own (restitution)   For example, the otherwise blameless child of a slave-owner 
whose inheritance stemmed partly from slave labor would have been morally required to 
relinquish the relevant portion of that legacy.  And those who have benefitted from 
discrimination against African Americans may now be required to share the resulting advantages 




 Reparations are due those who suffer directly or indirectly from slavery or Jim Crow or 
the harms they have caused.  But moral wrongs are not reducible to material harms.  On the one 
hand, people can suffer harms when no one is at fault, when caused by accidents or natural 
events; on the other hand, repairing material harms, such as economic losses, cannot fully repair 
moral wrongs, such as rape, torture, the forcible division of families, unwarranted contempt, and 
the denial of dignity.  At the very least, those who are culpable must also acknowledge and 
apologize for their wrongdoing.  Furthermore, reparations for slavery and Jim Crow should 
maximize the autonomy of its beneficiaries, e.g., by enabling them to decide how to use cash 
payments; for those systems of racial subordination greatly reduced the autonomy of those who 
were principally wronged. 
Two final points.  First, given the egregious wrongs of slavery and Jim Crow and their 
legacy of deeply entrenched harms, it might seem that compensation and restitution under a 
morally adequate reparations program could impoverish many Americans.  It should therefore be 
noted that what may properly be demanded of individuals is limited by considerations of 
humanity as well as justice.  All persons must be treated with dignity and due consideration, so 
that no one, including wrongdoers, should be impoverished by the reparations programs.  
Second, someone who was or still is entitled to reparations, such as a former slave or an African 
American who has lived under Jim Crow or who has suffered its persisting harms, may be said to 
have (or to have had) a valid moral claim to compensation.  As we have noted, however, the 
former slaves received no reparations following emancipation.  Some defenders of reparations 
today may reason that, as the reparations that were morally required were not forthcoming, moral 
claims to reparations have been passed down, like property, from one generation to the next, 




soundly be asserted today, quite independently of any continuing harms.  No such reasoning is 
assumed in the argument that follows.  The idea that such moral credits can be passed from one 
generation to another seems no more plausible than the idea that moral culpability can be 
inherited by a descendant of a wrongdoer.  In what follows, neither principle is assumed. 
 
III.  1865 
 What should a reparations program have been like when slavery was abolished?  One 
approach would have been to provide the former slaves with funds equivalent to the cash value 
of the wrongs that were imposed by slavery.  That would have enabled those who should have 
benefitted most directly to decide how best to do so. 
The initial problem when contemplating this approach would be to determine the rates at 
which compensation should be paid.  Consider a relatively simple example: compensation for 
unpaid labor under slavery.   We might imagine that the amount owed to a former slave was the 
product of the duration of unpaid labor and the prevailing rate for the same sort of work among 
free workers at the time (plus interest, in view of the delay of the payment).  But it is unclear 
what prevailing rate should be used, or even whether compensation at a prevailing rate would be 
fair.  On the one hand, free black workers were paid less than whites for the same work; on the 
other hand, it is possible that the prevailing rates for white workers when slavery dominated the 
economic system were depressed by the prevalence of slave labor.  These considerations suggest 
that compensation to the former slaves for their unpaid labor should be more generous than 
might initially seem appropriate. 
 A more serious problem is that such compensation should not be regarded as settling the 




coerced without moral justification, and the wrong of unjustifiably coercing someone is 
independent of wrongfully withholding compensation from that person (because compensation 
can be wrongfully withheld for labor that is not coerced – a problem that is faced today by many 
workers).  Furthermore, coercion has no standard cash equivalent. 
 The problem here is quite general: moral wrongs are not reducible to the material harms 
they involve, so the wrongs of slavery could not be repaired simply by compensating the former 
slaves for the material harms done.  Furthermore, morality does not determine appropriate cash 
payments for any moral wrongs, including the wrongs of slavery, which range from wrongfully 
separating parents from their children to rape. 
 I do not mean to dismiss cash payments.  In our society and many others, they are 
conventionally made to acknowledge wrongdoing.  This suggests that a morally acceptable 
reparations program would have included substantial cash payments for all ex-slaves and I shall 
assume that hereafter.  But how might these be determined?  By a fair process of negotiations in 
which the former slaves or their chosen representatives were among the principal participants. 
 So far we have looked at reparations for slavery as if it could consist in the piecemeal 
repair of a diverse collection of wrongs.  But repairing the wrongs done by slavery in America 
could not be like returning an item that was stolen, repairing a piece of property that one has 
carelessly damaged, and so on, down the line of injuries.  African Americans under slavery were 
denied the opportunity to develop their lives under the freedom and with the resources to which 
they were morally entitled as human beings.  They accordingly had a valid moral claim to be 
enabled to rebuild their lives as far as that was possible.  The claim would have  held against 
American governments at all levels and many individuals who had supported slavery; many 




help end slavery or ameliorate its wrongs when it was morally incumbent on them to take such 
action.  The institutions and individuals who were thus morally liable were morally obligated to 
contribute to a reparations program that would have enabled the former slaves to rebuild their 
lives, as far as that was possible. 
A morally adequate reparations program in 1865 would have included, first of all, the 
provision of services to address the former slaves’ most urgent needs, such as aid to trauma 
victims, general medical care, adequate housing, provisions, and clothing.  The reunion of 
families that were divided under slavery would have been facilitated, as well as the relocation of 
those who wished to rebuild their lives elsewhere.  The former slaves would have been offered 
the literacy training they had been denied. 
 Extensive organization would have been needed to provide such services.  Experience 
indicates that it would have been best if the former slaves (or, if necessary, their chosen 
representatives) implemented specific reparations programs, as they had already established their 
organizational and technical competence.  During the Civil War, for example, escaped slaves had 
been allocated large plantations that had been abandoned by their owners.  Without supervision 
by others, they made excellent use of the resources and created self-governing communities.  
What they had achieved was undone when President Johnson ordered that such lands be 
auctioned off or returned to their original owners (Foner, 1989, pp. 158-163).   
 In addition to addressing the ex-slaves’ most urgent needs (which was required by 
ordinary considerations of justice), a morally adequate reparations program would have provided 
them with sufficient resources to rebuild their lives.  One way of beginning to think about this is 
suggested by the 1865 proposal made by the Radical Republican congressional leader Thaddeus 




the wealthiest ten percent of Southern landowners, to be used as follows: forty acres were to be 
allotted to each adult ex-slave, and the remaining land was to be sold in lots of up to five hundred 
acres, the proceeds to provide pensions for Civil War veterans, compensation to loyal unionists 
for property losses in the Civil War, and retirement of the national debt (Foner, 1989, pp. 235-37, 
3-7-16). 
 Stevens’s plan could have provided the core of a morally acceptable reparations program, 
though much more would have been required.  Necessary additions would have included 
providing the former slaves who received land allotments with the materials and equipment that 
they would have needed to establish well-functioning farms, and insuring their access to credit, 
supplies, and markets, while those who wished to pursue other lines of work would have been 
provided with the necessary training and equipment.  The importance of Stevens’ plan is 
suggested by the fact that members of the African American community were pressing at the 
time for just such a distribution of land to the ex-slaves.  It appears that most ex-slaves wished to 
secure their freedom and gain economic independence as free farmers in their homeland, which 
was the rural South.  If Stevens’ plan had been implemented with the necessary supplements, the 
ex-slaves’ objective would have been realizable, for they had already established their capacity 
to work productively, with skill and foresight.  Such a plan would have helped the ex-slaves 
realize another aspect of social freedom:  land reform would have helped undermine the large 
landowners’ autocratic control of the South. It would also have helped promote genuine 
democracy. 
 The actual history of Reconstruction tells us that a morally adequate reparations program 
would also have included whatever measures were needed to secure the former slaves against re-




civil rights through an effective, systematic campaign, as extensive and as long-lasting as 
needed, against white supremacist ideology. 
 How could such a reparations program have been funded?    First, individuals and 
institutions that engaged in or supported slavery were morally obligated to help repair the wrongs 
to which they had contributed.  Second, some of the revenue from sale of the confiscated land 
might have been diverted to support the program.  Third, general taxation might also have been 
needed.  A fourth source of funding would have been restitution: the relinquishing of wrongful 
gains that had been received even by non-culpable parties.   This would have been an important 
source, as slave labor had contributed very substantially to income and wealth that went to others 
throughout the nation.  Thus non-culpable persons could have been called upon to help pay for 
reparations through both restitution and general taxation. 
 Such a program would have resembled a forward-looking reconstruction of society.  But 
it would have focused on what was owed to African Americans,  including cash payments, partly 
for morally symbolic reasons.  Its backward-looking character would be confirmed by the 
requirement that all culpable parties acknowledge and apologize to the former slaves for the 
wrongs of enslavement. 
It is quite possible that a morally adequate reparations program for slavery would have 
required a radical reconstruction not only of the South but of American society as a whole.  That 
would have been a virtue, not a fault, of such a program. 
 
IV. 1965/2015 
 Instead of reparations for slavery, African Americans experienced re-subordination under 




peonage and convict leasing (Blackmon, 2008).  Lynching helped consolidate Jim Crow and 
pogroms helped maintain racial subordination.  The last major, directly relevant legal advance of 
recent years was the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  That year will count, for present purposes, as 
the official end of Jim Crow, for it then lost significant support from the federal government 
(though many state governments in the Old South officially and practically opposed federal 
policy on civil rights; Webb, 2005). 
 What reparations did morality require in 1965?  Like slavery, Jim Crow was not a 
collection of diverse wrongful practices, but an all-encompassing system of subordination that 
embodied the doctrine of white supremacy.  It is true that the black community had become large 
enough and separate enough in urban areas to enable some African Americans to create 
successful businesses, acquire an education, become professionals, and afford decent housing.  
But all functioned within the constraints and damaging insecurity of a system that was predicated 
upon black vulnerability and white impunity.  A morally adequate reparations program for 
African Americans in 1965 would have dismantled the entire structure.  
 The 1947 report by the President’s Committee catalogued many of Jim Crow’s inequities, 
which had not substantially diminished by 1965.  Those deficits resulted not from racial 
inferiority (as white supremacists maintained) but from the nation’s failure to repair the wrongs 
of slavery and its re-subordination of African Americans under Jim Crow.  But a morally 
adequate reparations program would have done more than attack such deficits.  Morally adequate 
reparations would have included crash programs to reduce infant and maternal mortality among 
African Americans, provide adequate medical care more generally, reduce the various forms of 
environmental pollution that typically plague black neighborhoods, and promote life expectancy. 




and compensate for inequities in the administration of the law, and would have provided job 
training and productive jobs, on as large a scale as needed.  (Much work could have been 
provided by, for example, repairing and expanding the nation’s infrastructure, including public 
transportation, and constructing affordable housing.)  A morally adequate reparations program 
would have attacked the wealth gap between black and white families that results from Jim Crow 
housing policies, by enabling black families to acquire the homes they would otherwise have 
secured.  It would have provided safe and affordable child care and good public schools.  It 
would have increased wage and salary levels so that parents would not need to work multiple 
shifts and could devote adequate time with children. 
 A morally adequate program would also have persuasively explained the moral need for 
reparations and undertaken a vigorous, long-term program to combat White supremacist 
ideology.  It would have insured that culpable parties acknowledge and apologize for the wrongs 
of racial subordination and contribute to the cost of enabling African Americans to rebuild their 
lives.  And it would have taken whatever measures might be necessary to insure that re-
subordination could not occur again. 
 How would the cost of such a program be covered?  Partly by payments from parties 
found culpable, especially governments and private institutions; partly by restitution – the 
transfer of wrongful gains; and partly by general taxation.  But some of the costs would be offset 
by increased family incomes, which would promote spending, sales, manufacturing, jobs in the 
private sector, and increased tax revenues. 
 It seems clear that a morally adequate reparations program in 1965, as in 1865, would 




2014).  As we have noted,  the government never confronted the deeply entrenched legacy of 
slavery and Jim Crow, and its commitment to reform soon faded. 
 We should now consider the present.  What morality requires today by way of reparations 
is not much different from what it required in 1965.  As official measures now threaten the 
development of a “new Jim Crow,” government must first of all reverse its course. So, for 
example, justice requires a rapid end to the mindless, costly, wasteful, self-defeating policies that 
result in mass incarceration of non-violent offenders under mandatory sentencing laws. Called 
for are: the use of alternatives to imprisonment; adequate public financing for projects to 
expedite the release of prisoners who are demonstrably innocent of the crimes for which they 
were convicted; the provision of jobs with futures for those who have served their time; and the 
repeal of rules that exclude ex-felons from public housing and the ballot box.  Also required are 
multiple measures to address the needs of those at the very bottom; and for the re-establishment 
of voting rights reforms that have been nullified by restrictive state laws and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder (Rutenberg, 2015).  To these items must be added 
those listed under reparations for 1965 that are not covered above. 
 Once again, many of these measures could be justified on general considerations of 
justice, without recourse to reparations.  But a reparations program would focus on what was 
owed to African Americans, would include cash payments, and its backward-looking character 
would be confirmed by the requirement that all culpable parties be required to acknowledge and 






 It is time to acknowledge even wider applications of the moral considerations that I have 
discussed.  While slavery subordinated African Americans almost exclusively, its white 
supremacist rationale deeply affected other segments of American society that are conventionally 
categorized as non-white.  Insofar as my moral assumptions are sound, reparations on a very 
large scale can reasonably by claimed by Native Americans, Asian Americans, Latino 
Americans, and many immigrants who were seriously abused.  There is neither room here nor 
the need to discuss all of these cases or to trace differences among them.  It will suffice for 
present purposes to illustrate the general point with two examples. 
 During World War II, when Japan was one of America’s principal foes, one hundred and 
twenty thousand Japanese Americans were ordered from their West Coast homes and sent as 
prisoners to distant, isolated, barren “relocation centers.”  These facilities functioned as 
concentration camps.  Symptomatic of that was the orientation of guards and their weapons, 
which were directed inside, at the residents, so that some residents who wandered close to the 
fences were shot and killed (Irons, 1989). 
 Elements of the internment program were challenged, separately and unsuccessfully, by 
Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu.  Korematsu v. U.S. (323 U.S. 214 
(1944)) was the last of the three to be decided by the Supreme Court.  Writing for the Court, 
Justice Black accepted what he thought was the judgment of the military that internment was a 
necessary wartime security measure.  In their dissents, Justices Murphy and Jackson each 
characterized the internment program as “racist.”  
 In 1983, the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians established 
that the internment policy had been implemented despite the fact that all American security 




corresponding objections to internment by civilian officials had been suppressed by the 
government when it defended the internments in federal court (Korematsu v. U.S., 584 F.Supp. 
1406 (1984)).    These revelations led Congress and a somewhat reluctant president in 1988 to 
grant reparations of $20,000 apiece to living survivors of the camps or their heirs (Civil Liberties 
Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 904).  Three points may be made about the case.  First, as Justices Jackson 
and Murphy made clear, even the evidence that was available to the Court in 1944 indicated that 
the internment policy reflected official bias and pressure from White Americans who wanted to 
be rid of their Japanese American neighbors. Second, the reparations program that was 
implemented accounted for only a small fraction of the economic costs of internment, as entire 
families were uprooted, lost their homes, careers, property, some internees lost their health, and 
some lost their lives.  Third, the program acknowledged only a fraction of the injuries that had 
been inflicted on Japanese Americans by long-standing discrimination, beginning with the 
federal law that denied U.S. citizenship to Japanese (and many other) immigrants who officials 
classified as non-white.  To that insult, states along the West Coast added the injury of alien land 
laws, which were upheld by federal courts, that prevented non-citizens from acquiring real 
property.  A morally adequate reparations program for Japanese Americans would have repaired 
all of those injuries, as far as that was possible. 
 Now consider what reparations may reasonably be due Native Americans. The process of 
displacing, exterminating, and enslaving American Indians began before African Americans 
arrived in the New World.  It continued throughout the next four centuries, and has not yet 
ended.   Almost all of American territory, including Hawaii, has been taken from Native 
Americans – illegally, by America’s own legal standards.  Indian land cessions were coercively 




support have almost always been broken by the U.S. government.  Measures, such as poisoning 
wells and destroying food sources, have deliberately been taken to deprive Native Americans of 
subsistence.  Royalty payments for resources extracted from tribal lands have rarely been paid.  
And the federal government continues to deface and dishonor sacred Native America sites.  The 
wrongs inflicted upon American Indians have been so devastating, it is difficult to imagine what 
a morally adequate reparations program for them might be like (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014). 
In the present political climate it is difficult to imagine even one major component of any 
morally adequate reparations program being undertaken.  European Americans harbor greatly 
exaggerated conceptions of past reforms and as a result are generally blind to the deeply 
entrenched legacy of slavery, Jim Crow, and other systematic wrongdoing, such as the two 
examples mentioned.  Mainstream politicians reinforce persisting racial stereotypes, exploit 
economic anxieties, and mislead the public about long-term costs and benefits of reform. 
 Without minimizing the case for reparations to African Americans today, it seems clear 
that the full implications of reparations reasoning would call for much more than reparations -- 
an overhaul of American society to end racial stratification and create substantive conditions of 
equal opportunity for future generations.  However daunting such an aim may seem, experience 
shows that, while the success of efforts to achieve reform is unpredictable and can depend on 
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